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Abstract
A recent addition to the global discourse of China’s interaction with devel-
oping countries has been the claim that the Chinese government exports
prison labour to these countries. While no evidence is ever presented to sup-
port this claim, it has been widely circulated in international and local
media, as well as on the internet. This article examines the origins of the
rumour and the mechanisms of its transmission. It shows that while the
rumour often originates at the grass roots in developing countries, it is pro-
moted locally and globally by political, economic and media elites with dis-
tinct agendas that often involve building support for opposition parties,
competition in obtaining contracts, or geo-strategic and ideological rivalry.
We analyse the rumour’s circulation in light of the larger discourse on China
and developing countries, and discuss why Chinese official responses to the
claim have proved to be ineffective.
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A political rumour people believe is true can grow despite an absence of evidence,
if forces are interested in sustaining it. Take the rumours about US President
Barack Obama’s religious affiliation and birthplace. Obama emphasizes his
Christianity and has a US birth certificate, yet 2010 polls showed that only 46
per cent of supporters of his own Democratic Party believe he is a Christian,
down from 55 per cent in March 2009. Some 18 per cent of Americans, up
from 11 per cent 18 months earlier, believe him to be a Muslim and 43 per
cent say they do not know his religion, while 27 per cent (up from 20 per cent
four months earlier) doubt Obama was born in the United States, a constitutional
requisite to being president. Obama is demonstrably not the foreign-born Muslim
rumours depict, but his communications director has noted the credence placed
in the “tweets of discredited rabble-rousers.”1 Obama’s detractors concentrate
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in the media: 60 per cent of those polled who think he is a Muslim said they
learned it there, while 15 per cent cited his behaviour, words, ancestry, family
background, appearance or name.2 The media-spread rumour that he is a
foreign-born Muslim implies a belief that Obama, his aides, and public and pri-
vate organizations conspire to cover up the secrets of his true faith and nativity.
From the late 2000s, rumours have circulated globally that China sends con-
victs to developing states.3 In 2010, newspapers on five continents promoted
these rumours to “facts” by publishing sensational, but unsubstantiated, charges
about the export of Chinese prisoners.4 Brahma Chellaney, a strategic studies
specialist and Indian government advisor, made the charge, in an article with a
litany of problematic claims about Chinese conduct in developing states. He is,
however, only the best-known conjuror of this spectre. His claim is also one of
conspiracy, in which the Chinese government, its state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), and, it is implied, Chinese communities and national governments in
developing countries, keep secret the transfer of large numbers of Chinese con-
victs abroad.
This article first examines rumoured images of Chinese convict labour in devel-
oping countries and then analyses the confluence of actors and interests that have
produced and circulated the rumours. Finally, it gauges their political impact.
Rumours of Chinese convict labour began locally, “from below,” as conjectures
of non-elites, but their internet propagators – often Western visitors or expatri-
ates and members of the African diaspora in the West – put the rumours into
translocal circulation. They are further promoted “from above,” as part of a glo-
bal discourse of Chinese activities overseas, by those political and media elites
who seek to discredit the Chinese presence in the developing world and national
governments that approve of it. With its implications of cruel disregard for the
well-being of people in developing countries, the rumour will give added weight
to the existing host of allegations against the Chinese government and thus meet
its promoters’ expectations of haunting China for years to come.
Ghost Shadows: Images of Chinese Convicts Abroad
The notion of Chinese prisoners labouring abroad is not new. In the 1970s,
25,000 Chinese and 50,000 local workers built the Tanzania–Zambia Railway
(Tazara). When the first thousand Chinese workers arrived in Tanzania “all
2 “Growing number of Americans say Obama is a Muslim,” Pew Research Center, 19 August 2010, http://
pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Politics_and_Elections/growingnumber-full-report.pdf.
3 See e.g. Massimo Alberizzi, “Somalia: preoccupazione dietro i sorisi” (“Somalia: concern behind the
smiles”), Corrierre della Serra (Italy) 31 August 2007 (to conquer Africa, Chinese state uses forced
labour from China to build roads, buildings and railroads); Editorial, “Beware Chinese bearing
gifts,” Sunday Times (South Africa), 5 September 2010 (China’s “approach to building infrastructure
[is] shipping in prison labour rather than passing on skills and hiring locals”).
4 See e.g. “China now exports its convicts,” Japan Times, 5 July 2010; “Exporting convicts stains China’s
reputation,” Globe & Mail (Canada), 27 July 2010; “Convicts for export,” Daily News Egypt, 28 July
2010; “China’s newest export: convicts,” Guardian (UK), 29 July 2010; “China’s convict shame,” The
Australian, 5 August 2010.
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wearing identical grey cotton suits and balancing small blue suitcases on their
shoulders… curious onlookers gathered, some speculating the strangers were sol-
diers or prisoners sentenced to hard labour.”5 That impression was largely con-
fined to the two countries where the railway was built.
The rumour of Chinese convicts in Africa first received a modicum of global
circulation in 1991, through Roberta Cohen, a former US Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights. In arguing in the New York Times that
the US should deny China normal trade relations status, Cohen reported that
she had “learned” several years earlier that 75 per cent of workers that China’s
Jiangsu Construction Co. employed to build a road in Benin were Chinese con-
victs.6 She did not specify the source for the claim and the Chinese government
dismissed it as hearsay.7
By the late 2000s, articles could circulate massively on the internet. A British
tabloid article in 2008 entitled “How China is taking over Africa and why we
in the West should be VERY worried about it” claimed that: “As well as enticing
hundreds of thousands to settle in Africa, [Chinese officials] have even shipped
Chinese prisoners to produce the [infrastructure and other] goods cheaply.”8 It
was reproduced globally by other newspapers and soon appeared on thousands
of websites.
Chellaney’s article also appeared on more than ten thousand websites. Taken
by many as scholarly confirmation of earlier rumours, it created a “cascading”
effect.9 A popular Ghanaian website reprinted it under a caption querying “Is
China exporting prisoners to Ghana?” followed by “Yes. According to Indian
scholar Brahma Chellaney.”10 Chellaney however had said nothing about
Ghana. An NGO that monitors activities at the Chinese-owned Ramu mine in
Papua New Guinea (PNG) put Chellaney’s article on their website under the
headline “Is China sending convicts to PNG? Almost certainly.”11 No evidence
was presented of Chinese prisoners in PNG, which Chellaney had not mentioned.
Printed and internet rumours of Chinese convicts appear in at least half of
Africa’s states, in South Asia (Sri Lanka, the Maldives),12 Central Asia
(Tajikistan), the Caribbean (Antigua, Barbados, Bahamas, Grenada, Trinidad
and Dominica) and the Middle East (Dubai). Many kinds of work are attributed
to the supposed Chinese prisoners in Africa. They are said to have been made to
5 Jamie Monson, “Freedom railway: the unexpected successes of a Cold War development project,”
Boston Review (December 2004–January 2005).
6 Roberta Cohen, “China has used prison labor in Africa,” New York Times, 11 May 1991.
7 Chen Guoqing, “China doesn’t use prison labor in Africa,” New York Times, 1 June 1991.
8 Andrew Malone, Daily Mail, 18 July 2008.
9 Cass Sunstein, On Rumors (New York: Farrar, 2009), p. 21.
10 www.galizur.com, s.d., July 2010, www.galizur.com/forums/showthread.php/74-Is-China-exporting-
prisoners-to-Ghana?s=156b1490b91828b740e7b3c51eb7d00f.
11 Ramu Minewatch, 8 June 2010, http://ramumine.wordpress.com/2010/07/08/is-china-sending-convicts-
to-png-almost-certainly/.
12 This paragraph’s sources are newspapers articles and blogs that discuss the putative presence of Chinese
convicts in each county mentioned and have been omitted for reasons of space. To obtain these and
other sources making such claims please contact sobarrys@ust.hk.
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fight rebels, build a pipeline, guard oil installations in Sudan, put up parliament
buildings in Malawi and Gabon, work in mines and build power stations in
Zambia, labour on roads and plantations in Zimbabwe, work as textile and gar-
ment workers in [privately-owned Taiwanese] factories in Lesotho, slave in a
cement factory in Rwanda, engage in construction and even serve as “foreign
experts” in Nigeria, put up viaducts and roads in Ethiopia and hospitals, railways
and other infrastructure in Mauritania and Congo, lay highways and construct
Ministry of Defence buildings in Kenya, work for building companies in
Algeria, Mozambique, Mali, Senegal Togo and Equatorial Guinea, build stadia
in Ghana, Tanzania, Morocco and Liberia, create oil refineries in Angola and
Niger, and even sell doughnuts in Cameroon. Media and internet claims of
Chinese convicts in developing countries largely emanate from Western visitors
and expatriates from countries where Chinese convicts are said to work. A min-
ority of claims derive from people permanently residing in supposedly affected
countries. Fewer claims still involve people who work or live near sites where pur-
ported convicts labour or reside.
“Eyewitnesses” mostly draw inferences based on passive sightings of Chinese,
who are seen as having a putative characteristic of prisoners, such as engaging in
long hours of gruelling labour. For example, it has been implied that convict
labour may have been used to build a 1,500-kilometre oil pipeline in Sudan in
18 months because Chinese workers worked 14 hours a day in searing heat.13
An Angolan newspaper article that has been reprinted globally states:
A part of the workforce brought to Angola is formed by common prisoners … The Chinese
prisoners do not receive any salary and are only paid with food … According to the Courrier
International, there is no proof that the Chinese state sends prisoners to Angola, although the
labour and living conditions of Chinese workers is not very far from that of prisoners.14
The rumours set out three ways in which Chinese convicts come to developing
countries. Some say prisoners opt to do their time overseas; others that
ex-convicts are paroled into developing countries. Most, however, portray prison-
ers forcibly sent out to labour. An anthropologist encountered the rumour in
Namibia as involving prisoners who had the option of serving their time there:
Chinese… are both newcomers and foreigners, and are suspect to many locals under both head-
ings. This is most strikingly expressed in pervasive rumours. Many Namibians, including jour-
nalists, politicians, businesspeople, and academics alike, are convinced Chinese convicts can
choose to serve their prison terms on Namibian construction sites. These rumours are obviously
unfounded, but readily believed.15
A website highly critical of China’s religious policies cited Chellaney and stated
that in developing countries there are Chinese “prisoners on conditional
13 See e.g. Human Rights First, “Investing in tragedy: China, money, arms, and politics in Sudan,” 2008,
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf.
14 Aguiar dos Santos, “China conquista Luanda” (“China conquers Luanda”), Oozebap (Spain), 8 June
2006, www.oozebap.org/text/china-africa.htm.
15 Gregor Dobler, “Solidarity, xenophobia and the regulation of Chinese businesses in Namibia,” in Chris
Alden (ed.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), pp. 237–55 at p. 243.
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release.”16 Most claims, however, assume that Chinese prisoners are sentenced to
deportation labour for a term of years, what Chellaney terms “forced dispatch.”
Whatever method is used to send out this putative part of the prison population,
their image is of victims of an especially cruel Chinese government and of com-
pliant receiving governments, rewarded by China. Developing country ruling
elites are thereby shown to conform to their Western media image of
“pro-China,” in contrast to non-elites, who supposedly oppose the “colonial”
relationship that China allegedly has with developing countries, especially in
Africa. Surveyed African non-elites, however, generally also have a favourable
view of China and Chinese, with the opposite view often a consequence of
national opposition parties’ efforts.17
Relations of subordination and conspiracy involving Chinese and African
governments are assumed by those who advance rumours of convict labour. For
example, a poster to a Zambia-related SMS site claimed that the Zambian govern-
ment agreed to repay aUS$1.7million loan that China provided to cover the cost of
Chinese convicts building a housingproject inLusaka,18 implying that local officials
knew theChineseworkerswere prisoners. Sometimes, as in the case of aFrenchweb-
site posting onChinese prisoners inAfrica, it is speculated thatAfrican countries are
silent about them because it is “one of the conditions by which China lends them
their dollars.”19 Rumours may also include charges of corruption among national
officials. A Zambian newspaper website post by a Zambian in Australia, about
Chinese firms rehabilitating stadia, contended that “most of the people employed
on these contracts are Chinese prisoners,” which must be the result of kickbacks.20
TheChinese government is thus rumoured to arrange the outflow of convicts to jobs
in developing countries, while host governments condone their inflow for political
andpecuniary reasons. Several factors involvingmisperception at their source create
popularly based rumours of this arrangement, but other factors, involving national
and international politics, propel their transmission to a global audience.
Rumours Local, Translocal and Global
Rumours, it is said, are “improvised news” in which people comment upon events
around them, collectively in ambiguous situations.21 Average people “lacking
direct or personal knowledge” rely on them to understand new phenomena
16 “Chinese prisoners used as laborers in developing countries,” AsiaNews.it, 12 August 2010,
www.asianews.it/news-en/Chinese-prisoners-used-as-labourers-in-developing-countries-19180.html.
17 See Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “African perspectives on China–Africa links,” The China
Quarterly, No. 199 (2009), pp. 729–60.
18 Aaron Marlecy, “Chinese investors (new deal Chinese),” 30 April 2007, www.mysms.co.zm/
forum_thread.php?id=495.
19 Trueslash post to “Des prisonniers Chinois travaillent en Afrique?” (“Chinese prisoners working in
Africa?”), Hardware.fr, 12 March 2007.
20 M.T. Banda, post no. 25 to “Chinese company wins three stadia contracts,” Lusaka Times (LT), 9 April
2009.
21 Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1966).
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and rationalize their belief in the rumour by “where there is smoke, there must be
fire.”22 Elites, such as business people, politicians and researchers, may engage in
rumour-mongering for different ends. Politics often leads to fostering unsubstan-
tiated claims, such as those of Chinese convicts labouring overseas.
Local rumours
In Africa and other developing regions, rumours of the presence of Chinese pris-
oners arise partly because of cultural differences in work and living habits. A rig-
orous work pace, discipline and collective living style among Chinese employees
cause people to imagine they are prisoners. When Chinese workers and engineers
came to build Tazara, the discipline observed by the Chinese was comprehensive.
A translator for the railway project known as Mama Li, who became a long-term
resident of Tanzania, told us of her experience then:
We were taught how to be disciplined and respond to certain kinds of questions, etc. We were
not allowed to go out on our own, unless there were at least three people in the group … We
were given two sets of the same grey uniform. We often went to events collectively … When
we did, we formed lines and walked. That’s partly why some people said that those who worked
on Tazara were prisoners: we were so very disciplined. Those people who spread these rumours
also may have had bad intentions. Actually those who were chosen to go abroad those days
were the ones who were the better qualified, both in terms of expertise and ideology.23
In the eyes of Mama Li and other lao Feizhou老非洲 (old African-hands) of her
generation, “if there was too much discipline in the 1970s, there’s now too little
discipline” among Chinese in Africa today. Be that as it may, Chinese employees
have a distinctively vigorous work pace in the eyes of non-Chinese. A Swiss
anthropologist who heard rumours of Chinese convicts in two African countries
attributed them to “Chinese workers’ phenomenal work pace.”24 A Chinese
engineer recounted that in Angola, Africans urged him to adopt “Angola
time” because his timetables were impossible. He replied that a Chinese firm
built a giant tower there in less than two years, while a neighbouring edifice
being built by non-Chinese was unfinished after ten years.25
As in the Tazara era, Chinese skilled workers and engineers still do not live like
Western expatriates, who in developing countries have individual houses and
local servants. Many Chinese live collectively, in compounds, which provoked
Zambian elites we interviewed to remark on their obvious lack of concern for
status, either positively (“refreshing”) or negatively (“they don’t behave like
expats”). A UK Zambian who often posts on Zambian newspaper websites com-
plained of Chinese in a mining town in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province: “These
people have bundled 20 people in one house … It will not be long before we
22 Sunstein, On Rumors, p. 5.
23 Interview with Li Jinglan, Dar Es Salaam, 16 July 2006.
24 Antoine Kernen, “Small and medium-sized Chinese businesses in Mali and Senegal, African and Asian
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2010), pp. 252–68.
25 Tessa Thornilley, “Chinese entrepreneurs ‘invade’ Africa,” Uhuru (Nigeria), 7 August 2010. See also
“Africans marvel at China’s hard workers,” The Chronicle (Ghana), 4 September 2008.
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hear of SARS breaking out in Chililabombwe and spread across to innocent
Zambians.”26
An Irish journalist said that typical Chinese living habits in Africa “encourage
sometimes fantastical speculation about the new arrivals and the way they live.
One frequently heard rumour in Angola is that China has sent … prisoners
over to work on the roads.”27 Many Chinese share rooms and do their own
housework. Local people often cannot imagine foreign professionals living that
way and imagine them to be prisoners. Deborah Brautigam, a US specialist of
China–Africa relations, said “Some of these (Chinese) experts living at local stan-
dards have led local people to think that they must be convicts, because who else
would live like that?”28
Rumours circulate in part because of local people’s lack of direct knowledge
about China and the Chinese. A new local interest has also emerged to motivate
the rumour’s circulation. A leader of the then opposition Patriotic Front in
Copperbelt pointed out that Zambians think that “if 100 Chinese come, 20 of
them are skilled and the other 80 are unskilled prisoners. It’s a way for local
people to demean the Chinese and to say we’re better than the [prisoners].”29
For some locals who depend on labour markets for their livelihood and find
Chinese work styles and pace inexplicable and threatening, the rumour “ration-
alizes while it relieves.”30
The rumours’ translocal and global transmission
The blogs and web posts that we cite are mostly transmitted translocally by
Westerners who have lived or visited developing countries or by diasporic mem-
bers from those countries who live in the West. Most people in the West have a
negative view of China’s overseas activities. In a 2007 poll, half of US respon-
dents saw China’s influence in Africa as a great or moderate threat to US
national interests.31 A 2008 poll of Western Europeans found that most saw
China as the greatest threat to global stability.32 Negativity about China and
Chinese activities overseas creates a predisposition for “biased assimilation” of
rumours:33 anti-China sentiment makes it more likely to believe the rumour
and a belief in the rumour reinforces anti-China sentiment.
A typical claim comes from a white expatriate microfinance specialist working
in Malawi, who discusses “Chinese imperialism in Africa”:
Chinese prisoners in the mainland, convicted of crimes, are sometimes given the option of ser-
ving their sentence in Chinese prison, or to go to Africa and live and work with the mineral
26 Alfred Mutale, post no. 1 to “Criticism of China in mineral rich Zambia,” LT, 2 February 2007.
27 Mary Fitzgerald, “West’s difficulty in Angola is Beijing’s opportunity,” Irish Times, 26 August 2008.
28 “African respect for Chinese expatriates grows,” Voice of America, 8 May 2007.
29 Interview with Robert Mwewa, PF treasurer, Copperbelt Province, Ndola, 15 July 2008.
30 Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York: Henry Holt, 1947), p. 503.
31 “UPI Poll: China’s influence in Africa,” United Press International, 27 July 2007.
32 “China seen as biggest threat to stability,” Financial Times, 15 April 2008.
33 Sunstein, On Rumors, p. 9.
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extraction/road construction … Many of these prisoners also work on construction projects for
China, all to the end of getting these metals back to China. It just blows me away that in the 21st
century, a country could or would establish a penal colony.34
People with negative views of Chinese activities in the world are inclined to
believe China sends out convicts, despite a lack of evidence, as a result of a syl-
logistic reasoning: China does bad things in the world; sending convicts to labour
in developing countries is a bad thing, ergo assertions that China sends convicts
to do so are true.
Belief in a rumour makes its transmission more likely. So does high anxiety
where a rumour involves danger, such as a murderer (or foreign convict) being
on the loose.35 In the case of the rumour of Chinese convicts working in devel-
oping countries, the danger-induced anxiety is linked to the criminality of their
presence36 and presumed super-competitiveness that their presence brings to
Chinese business. The rumour thus criminalizes Chinese workers and firms and
casts their presence as a government conspiracy. The perceived threat compels
the rumour’s global transmission even where transmitters realize they have no
evidence. The easier access to the internet by people connected with the West
facilitates the rumour’s translocal transmission on the internet. For example,
two (white) South African visitors to Mozambique recalled that:
On our trip we have picked up the vibe and the talk on the street that China is going to take over
Africa. In Mozam they are building a new soccer stadium which was behind schedule, so they
have imported 350 Chinese prisoners, got rid of the locals, of course they don’t have to pay the
prisoners either, work them to death and in the evenings house them in containers, wonderful.
(That’s the story we are told.)37
That Chinese stadia-builders were claimed to be housed in containers probably
added verisimilitude to the rumour they were prisoners, as it has with a claim
that Chinese prisoners who built Maputo, Mozambique’s airport, lived in con-
tainers.38 We have seen Chinese in Africa who were not convicts but lived in con-
tainers or container-like pre-fabricated housing, habitation common for
construction workers in China.
Researchers and political and media elites who bring rumours from blogs and
internet posts to formal publications are crucial to their global circulation.
Researchers who transmit rumours are in a different category from non-scholars,
who may take rumours at face value and informally spread them. Even if they
present no evidence, researchers’ professional status often makes their assertions
34 “China’s new heart of darkness,” Mullings and Ruminations, 19 February 2010. http://
mullingsandruminations.com/.
35 Mark Pezzo and Jason Beckstead, “A multilevel analysis of rumor transmission: effects of anxiety and
belief in two field experiments,” Basic and Applied Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp. 91–100.
36 A British visitor claimed “with Chinese convicts bored in Malawi there have been reports of crimes
including rape having been committed by them.” Unreported Africa. A Sri Lankan news article associ-
ated Chinese, including “prisoners” with “various crimes here,” including rape. “20,000 Indian work-
force,” Daily Mirror, 31 August 2010.
37 John and Arlene, “Welcome to Africa on a wing and a prayer,” 4 July 2009, www.
africaonawingandaprayer.com/. A French-language Algerian newspaper has even claimed that
Chinese prisoners who built the oil pipeline in Sudan were shipped there in containers. Travail Force.
38 Carol Lazar, “Travel,” The Star (Johannesburg), 4 September 2010.
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credible. Days after Chellaney’s article appeared, a prominent developer in the
Caribbean island state of Dominica approached local media to demand the gov-
ernment “determine whether or not some or all of the Chinese workers on the
West Coast Road project are in fact convicts released on parole.” Criticizing
the local government for laxity, he referred to Chellaney’s charges and asserted
they contained “documented facts” about countries with similarities to con-
ditions in Dominica.39 As with Chellaney, the developer presented no evidence
that the road builders were prisoners, but insisted that local labour laws were
not being applied to “the Chinese.”40 The Dominica government responded by
stating that it had no information of any Chinese prisoners in Dominica and
that the road building firm was reputable. Online commentators dismissed this
statement as not credible however, because it emanated from the government.41
In the Bahamas, critics of the government, citing Chellaney – who had said noth-
ing about the country in his articles – berated it for approving work permits for
“Chinese convicts” to build a $2.5 billion resort.42
Chellaney is but the latest scholar to propagate the rumour of Chinese con-
victs. Earlier, Gerard Prunier, an historian of the Horn of Africa who has been
sharply critical of China’s activities in Sudan, stated that 10,000 Chinese who
built the oil pipeline there in the late 1990s “provided almost free labour (their
workers were convicts who came to Sudan in exchange for a reduction in their
sentences).” That he presented no evidence did not prevent a leading French
newspaper from publishing his claim.43 A Quebec television website devoted to
Sudan conflicts then put it that “A little known, but quite curious phenomenon
is that of Chinese convicts who built the oil pipeline. The work was protected by
thousands of Chinese soldiers, one of the most imposing military deployments
outside China’s borders.”44
Media actively promote the rumour of Chinese convict labour. Chellaney’s
article initially circulated in several newspapers. When we asked a media insider
in Hong Kong why the city’s preeminent English newspaper printed Chellaney’s
story, he responded that Chellaney is a frequent contributor to the media and this
story fits thinking that editors already have about China. Representations by
Western-led media about China in developing countries are often unfavourable
and condescending. A study of UK broadsheet newspapers’ treatment of
China–Africa links found they are generally negative about it, and treat
Africans as passive, childish actors while disregarding negative roles played by
39 “Local News,” Q95 FM radio (Dominica), 12 August 2010, www.wiceqfm.com/past_thu.html.
40 “Businessman says government should apply labour laws to Chinese nationals,” Kairi FM (Dominica),
19 August 2010, http://kairifm.dm/modules/news/article.php?storyid=604.
41 “Government has no information indicating Chinese engineers are prisoners: national security minis-
ter,” Dominica News Online, 31 August 2010.
42 “Hubert Ingraham to decide if he will allow 5,000 Chinese convicts to enter the country,” Bahamas
News, 7 September 2010.
43 Gerard Prunier, “Sudan: irreconcilable differences,” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2002.
44 “Soudan: Pax Americana,” Points Chauds: TeleQuebec, February 2004, http://points.telequebec.tv/
sujet.aspx?EmissionID=46.
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Western entities in Africa.45 A study of German media reached similar con-
clusions.46 US journalist Te-Ping Chen has termed Western representations of
China in Africa “the negative narrative.”47 Because China is a seen as a compe-
titor for Western interests and has a policy framework for developing countries
not fully aligned with Western-led “global governance,” media negativity
about Chinese activities persists, despite some scholars’ nuanced analysis
and contrary evidence from pollsters on Africans’ views about the Chinese
presence.48
Media promotion of the rumour lends it a veneer of credibility and authority
and creates conditions for what Sunstein calls “conformity cascades”: the claim’s
circulation through the world’s mainly Western-dominated media is enough for
some observers to put aside their own doubts about the rumour’s logic.
A Dutch film specialist has written of his reaction to an Austrian filmmaker’s
seeming discovery of Chinese convicts building a stadium in Mozambique:
One day Ella observed the transport of a large group of Chinese prisoners to a building site.
I imagined that the construction workers would live like prisoners … but actual prisoners I
felt for sure hard to believe in a continent like Africa, where human labour is so available
and so cheap. Anyway, when you google the words Africa/Chinese/prisoners you will have to
believe.49
Rumour mongering: domestic politics
Popular rumours of Chinese convicts also have a domestic political aspect.
Western media often quote Michael Sata, leader of Zambia’s then opposition
Patriotic Front (PF). In one of his anti-Chinese mobilizations, he claimed:
“Zambia has become a labour camp. Most of the Chinese are prisoners of con-
science.”50 Some scholars, relying on media accounts, have echoed Sata’s view.
For example, two Taiwan-based scholars claimed that: “In the last decade,
over 30,000 Chinese had poured into Zambia, where low pay and abysmal work-
ing conditions give Chinese operations the look of penal colonies.”51 Frank
Bwalya, a priest famous for criticizing the Zambian government, stated at a
2010 rally that: “Zambia has become a foreign prison for China. Prisoners
45 Emma Mawdsley, “Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China,
Africa and the West in British broadsheet newspapers,” Political Geography, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2008),
pp. 509–29.
46 Carola Richter and Sebastien Gebauer, Die China-Berichterstatung in den deutschen Medien (China
Reporting in the German Media) (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), pp. 18, 161, www.boell.de/
downloads/bildungkultur/Neue_Endf_Studie_China-Berichterstatung.pdf.
47 Te-Ping Chen, “China in Africa podcast: understanding the negative narrative,” China Talking Points,
12 June 2010, www.chinatalkingpoints.com/china-in-africa-podcast-the-negative-narrative/.
48 See Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “African perspectives on China–Africa links,” The China
Quarterly, No. 199 (2009), pp. 728–59.
49 Gert Jan Zuilhof, “Raiding Africa,” International Film Festival Rotterdam, s.d. 2010, www.
filmfestivalrotterdam.com/professionals/blogs/gertjan_zuilhof/raiding-africa-/.
50 Bivan Saluseki, “I’m not ashamed to deal with Taiwan, says Sata,” The Post (Zambia), 1 November
2007.
51 Songok Han Thornton and William H. Thornton, Development without Freedom: The Politics of Asian
Globalization (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2008), p. 194.
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from China are being brought to work in Zambia. The government should pro-
vide jobs for Zambians.”52
In Zambia, the rumour is also a repudiation of Zambia’s then ruling
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). A post to a Zambian newspaper
website from a Zambian in Israel stated that:
Chililabombwe, Kamenza Township has been infested by Chinese. There are close to 500
Chinese in Chililabombwe alone … They are not qualified and skilled as Movement for
Multi-Party Democracy ministers put it. In fact, they have said they are prisoners where they
come from. They are in Zambia to serve prison sentences. And now there are Indians moving
in groups in Kamenza Township … Mr Sata is right.53
We have been to Chililabombwe and interviewed Chinese, from an Anhui
province-based mining construction firm working on mine shafts. Their working
and living conditions typified those that give rise to rumours of Chinese prisoners:
they move around in groups to their worksites and live dormitory-style, eight to a
house. In no other respect is there the slightest hint they are convicts however.
The poster mentioned above and a Zambian in Canada who claimed Chinese con-
victs work in a Zambian mine,54 were probably unaware that in 2007, a Minister was
asked in Zambia’s parliament about Chinese convicts supposedly working at the
Chambishi copper mine, owned by China’s Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Co.
(CNMC). In 2010, a question was also raised in parliament about Chinese serving
prison sentences in Zambia. The questioner in both cases was Chishimba Kambwili,
a PF MP from Luanshya, a town now home to another CNMC-owned copper
mine. No onewho follows Zambian politics would have failed to understand that rais-
ing thematterof“Chinese inZambiato serveprisonsentences”wasanoppositioneffort
to embarrass the MMD government, which is “pro-China,” but also “pro-Western.”
In 2007, Kambwili asked how many Chinese prisoners work for the Chambishi
mine. The Minister of Mines replied that the Department of Immigration issues
work permits and confirmed there are no Chinese prisoners. Without offering evi-
dence, Kambwili said he was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt” that the
Chinese government has prisoners at the Chambishi mine and asked whether the
Ministry “had been to Chambishi to find out on their own whether there are
Chinese prisoners working at the mine.” The Minister spoke of “very exhaustive
research” in which official and non-official sources confirmed there were no prison-
ers. He referred to “stringent instruments” of national and international law on
prison labour and said Zambian law requires that prison labour be approved by
the Commissioner-General of Prisons, who rarely does so. The Minister added
that there is a United Nations convention to be satisfied,55 so “it would be unlawful
for any government to engage in this type of activity.” He mentioned a lack of
52 “Change is inevitable, observes Fr Bwalya,” The Post (Zambia), 19 January 2010.
53 Godfrey Ndhlovu, post no. 35 to “Government refutes Sata’s claims over Chinese nationals in Zambia,”
LT, 27 October 2007.
54 Hard MC, post no. 62 to “Zambia deplore the indictment of Sudanese president,” LT, July 24, 2010.
55 The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, a non-binding UN document. The export
of prison-made goods or convict labour per se does not appear to violate international law. See Nigel
Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
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reciprocal agreement with China to bring in prisoners and asked Kambwili for evi-
dence. Another PF MP asked what mechanism was in place to “screen these
Chinese who are coming into this country so that we know whether they are prison-
ers or not ….” The Minister said that in the work permits process “if there is any
disclosure that a particular individual is a prisoner, we will probably not allow
him to work here because we do not have that kind of arrangement.”56
In 2010, the question asked was “how many foreign nationals were serving
prison sentences in Zambia in 2008 and 2009?” This may have been an indirect
way of raising the same matter as in 2007, while not confining the question to
mining at Chambishi. The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs replied that 761
foreigners of 31 nationalities were serving prison sentences in Zambia and pro-
duced a breakdown of these prisoners by nationality. PF MPs then enquired
about only one nationality: Chinese. They asked why it was not on the list and
were told that it was not there because no Chinese had been sentenced to prison
in Zambia.57
The question of Chinese convicts has also become part of Sri Lankan politics.
The main opposition, the neo-liberal United National Party (UNP), claimed in
2009 that 400 unskilled and semi-skilled Chinese prisoners were among builders
of the biggest port in South Asia, at Hambantota, President Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s home town. The billion dollar project, 85 per cent financed by
China Exim Bank concessionary loans, was begun by China Harbor
Engineering and Sinohydro Corp. in 2008.58 The UNP claimed that Chinese
infrastructure building is making Sri Lanka a colony, that Sri Lanka has
25,000 Chinese convicts (2,042 at Hambantota), and that Chinese projects
exist due to official corruption.59 A UNP MP said most of “over a lakh”
(100,000) Chinese working in Sri Lanka are prisoners who will not return to
China.60 The rumour is also promoted by an India-based ethnic Tamil party,
which complains that Sri Lanka’s government gives contracts to rebuild
Tamil areas ruined in Sri Lanka’s civil war to Chinese, not Tamils. It also
alleges that prisoners are used as a cover for Chinese intelligence
agencies.61 Local media have run stories that assert Chinese prisoners will
stay on in Sri Lanka, perhaps in order to create Chinese military bases close
56 “Chinese prisoners employed by NFC Mining Plc,” National Assembly of Zambia, 3 August 2007,
www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=576&Itemid=86&limit=1&
limitstart=3.
57 “Foreignnationals servingprison sentences,”NationalAssemblyofZambia, 17March2010,www.parliament.
gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1138&Itemid=86&limit=1&limitstart=2.
58 “Can China bear a regime change in SL?” Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka), 11 November 2009; Halik Azeez,
“China holds sway at Hambantota,” Sunday Leader (Sri Lanka), 4 July 2010.
59 “SL would virtually become a Chinese colony: UNP MP,” Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka), 10 June 2010; “SL
is now a China’s colony: Dayasiri Jayasekera,” Colombo Times, 11 June 2010.
60 “Sri Lanka will become a Chinese colony at the end of the Rajapaksa regime: UNP MP Rajan
Ramanayake,” 24 July 2010, http://worldtamilrefugeefroum.blogspot.com/2010/07/if-this-situation-
continues-without-any.html.
61 “Jayalithaa wams centre against presence of Chinese convict labour in Lanka,” The Statesman (India),
18 June 2010.
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to India.62 No evidence of a Chinese convict presence has been presented, but
Sri Lankan journalists critical of the government speak of it as a fact:
That a large number of Chinese convicts are present in various parts of the country, engaging in
manual labour in Chinese-funded infrastructure projects is an open secret. This is an unprece-
dented development which can have long-term repercussions, both national and regional.63
More than a month before Chellaney’s claim of Chinese convicts in Sri Lanka,
that country’s government stated that no Chinese prisoners were employed in
the country.64 Yet, in his articles, Chellaney neglected to mention this denial.
In some developing countries, rumours of Chinese prisoners also have deliber-
ate economic aims, connected to competition between local and Chinese con-
struction companies. This charge has been made by a prominent local building
firm owner in Sri Lanka65 and by the CEO of a “leading player” in Kenya’s con-
struction industry.66 In Namibia, a local construction boss stated: “We have a
hard time getting jobs from government, while the Chinese ship in container-
loads of prisoners to work on public projects.”67 An Irish visitor to Tajikistan,
upon seeing a road being built from the Chinese border to the capital,
Dushanbe, recounted: “I was told it was being built by Chinese convicts so
that the country could be flooded with cheap products.”68 He attributed the
rumour to anti-Chinese racism common in Central Asia, but it may have origi-
nated with Tajik business people whose goods compete with Chinese products.
Rumour mongering: international politics
Then there is international politics. What else could promoters of the China
Threat idea, such as Challeney, add to their litany of charges that would be suffi-
cient to provoke a headline like the one that accompanied his article in a Thai
newspaper: “China’s global human rights reputation hits new low”?69 What bet-
ter way to deflate China’s soft power than to claim it exports prison labour,
thereby undermining security and employment opportunities in receiving states.
An analysis of China–Sri Lanka relations note that the rumours “have the poten-
tial of triggering anti-China public sentiment and souring the current Sino-Sri
Lankan bonhomie.”70
62 See e.g. Policy Research Group, “How the Chinese dragon is gobbling up the Sri Lankan lion,” lanka-
newspapers.com, 15 May 2010; “One lakh ten thousand Chinese in SL irk Indian and American govts,”
Lanka-e-news, 15 May 2010, http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=9550.
63 Tisaranee Guansekara, “The war on media resumes,” Asian Tribune, 1 August 2010.
64 Sharmila, “External Affairs Ministry says Chinese prisoners not employed in Sri Lanka,” Virakesari (Sri
Lanka), 20 June 2010, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 June 2010.
65 “Chinese prisoners used in Lankan development projects,” Colombo Times, 22 December 2009.
66 “Spencon cries foul over Chinese industry invasion,” East African Business Week, 15 October 2007.
67 S. van den Bosch, “China in Africa: south–south exploitation?” InterPress Service, 21 May 2009.
68 Will Clowes, “China changing minds,” Trinity News (Ireland), No. 4 (2008), www.trinitynews.ie/index.
php/features/6-features/331-…?fontstyle=f-smaller.
69 Brahma Chellaney, “Convicts for exports: China’s global human rights reputation hits new low,” The
Nation, 29 July 2010.
70 Sudha Ramachandran, “Sri Lankan waters run deep with China,” Asia Times, 13 August 2010, www.
atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH13Df02.html.
410 The China Quarterly, 210, June 2012, pp. 398–418
There was an issue in the US in the 1990s concerning China exporting prison-
made goods to the United States. The US compelled China to prohibit such
exports, even though the US itself exports prison-made goods and allows for pri-
vate use of prison labour, in violation of international law protections against
forced labour.71 For example, in 2010 BP extensively used (overwhelmingly
African-American) unpaid prison labour in the US Gulf Coast oil clean-up,
working convicts up to 72 hours a week under hazardous conditions and housing
many in containers.72 The issue of China’s exported prison-made goods never
caught on outside the US, however, and has receded, but it has been replaced
by the rumour of Chinese convicts abroad.
In response to a plan by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to export California
convicts to Mexican prisons, it has been noted that a sovereign nation is not obliged
to receive prisoners who have not committed crimes within its borders.73 In fact,
exported prisoners could hardly come even covertly, because few governments
would accept the political and security risks. Early colonial period English
philosopher-scientist Francis Bacon articulated the common sentiment that it is sha-
meful to export convicts, who are “the scum of people and wicked condemned
men.”74 In the late 18th and 19th centuries, the US criminalized importation of con-
victs,75 because, as President Abraham Lincoln’s future Secretary of State William
Seward orated, if Europe sent convicts to the US, it would “deteriorate fatally the
character, the prosperity and the virtue of the people.”76 When British Indian auth-
orities sought to send to present-day Malaysia and Singapore rebels captured
during India’s first war for independence, those colonies refused to take them.77
After Chellaney’s article appeared, an Indian newspaper reported that:
Several diplomats … from countries where Chinese firms were working on big projects dis-
missed the likelihood that prison labour was being widely used, citing security concerns as
well as an already sensitive situation involving Chinese firms overseas … “Chinese workers
overseas is already a sensitive issue, just by their being there and working on projects in large
numbers,” said a diplomat from an African country. “Why on earth will China make matters
worse by shipping out criminals? It is very hard to believe.”78
The US government has, however, spread rumours about the export of Chinese
convict labour. In a 2010 State Department report on human trafficking it
asserted that:
71 Susan Kang, “Forcing prison labor: international labor standards, human rights and the privatization of
prison labor in the contemporary United States,” New Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2009), pp. 139–
61 at p. 160.
72 “BP hires prison labor to clean up spill while coastal residents struggle,” The Nation (US), 21 July 2010.
73 “Governor looks south of the border for prisons,” San Francisco Chronicle, 26 January 2010.
74 Francis Bacon, “On plantations,” in Essays: Moral, Economical and Political (London: John Sharpe,
1822)[1597], pp. 125–28 at p.125.
75 See Juliet Stumpf, “States of confusion: the rise of state and local power over immigration,” North
Carolina Law Review, No. 88 (2008), pp. 1557–1618 at p. 1567.
76 “Senator Seward’s western tour,” New York Times, 15 September 1860.
77 Anand Yang, “Indian convict workers in Southeast Asia in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,”
Journal of World History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 179–208 at pp. 207–08.
78 “China denies exporting convict labor for overseas projects,” The Hindu, 11 August 2010.
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An increasing number of Chinese and Indian men recruited to work in Chinese or Indian-owned
mines in Zambia’s Copperbelt region are reportedly exploited by the mining companies in
forced labor. After work hours, some Chinese miners are confined to guarded compounds sur-
rounded by high concrete walls topped by electrified barbed wire.79
We have interviewed Chinese at mines in Zambia. They are salaried, highly skilled
workers, engineers or managers. Their compounds’ walls and wire serve the same
function as similar structures throughout Africa and the world: to keep out
intruders.
Rumour refuting
Propagators of rumours of exported Chinese convict labour have failed to offer evi-
dence, which might include reports of escapees, asylum applications, admissions by
some Chinese to outsiders or within Chinese communities, or physical discipline and
strict surveillance of workers by Chinese supervisors. No such evidence exists; yet,
confronted by persistent, pervasive rumours, only a few observers retain a modicum
of scepticism. A Western expatriate in Mozambique has sardonically blogged:
I often see a Chinese bus full of sleepy, overall-clad workers being ferried across town in the
early morning, and fancy that these are the convicts. But, probably not … these guys look mis-
erable, but not that miserable! I’d like to know where these convicts are. Do they wear stripes?
Are they on chain-gangs? Have any yet fled into the African bush?!80
The last of this observer’s rhetorical questions is pertinent: why have no
escapes been reported? From 1717 to 1787, British authorities sent 20,000 con-
victs to their colonies in Virginia and Maryland and 16 per cent of those trans-
ported to Maryland escaped after arrival.81 There are now hundreds of
thousands of Chinese in Africa, with some living furtively due to a lack of
visas. One would expect at least some putative cases of convicts doing the
same. If Chinese convicts were in developing countries, states that regard
China as a “strategic competitor” could also gain a propaganda coup by welcom-
ing convicts to their embassies as political asylum applicants.
There may be former Chinese prisoners among the hundreds of thousands of
Chinese working in developing countries, but no research on the Chinese pres-
ence in Africa has found the rumours of Chinese convict labour to be true. In
the ten African countries where we have carried out research on China–Africa
links, no one we spoke to about Chinese convicts could substantiate the rumours.
Chinese construction firm managers not only deny it, but find it risible:
The construction company representatives laugh when confronted with talk of droves of
Chinese convicts being brought to Namibia to work on construction sites, in the process
79 US State Department, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2010: country narrative: countries N through Z,”
14 June 2010, www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142761.htm.
80 Dom, “China in Mozambique,” Africa Heart, 4 March 2010, http://dominika-debska.blogspot.com/
2010_03_01_archive.html.
81 John Langbein, “The historical origins of sanction of imprisonment for serious crime,” The Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1976), pp. 25–60 at p. 58; Farley Grubb, “The transatlantic market for
British contract labor,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2000), pp. 94–122 at p. 108.
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denying Namibians much needed jobs, and add that over the years many more rumours have
been spread in order to discredit them.82
Chinese managers we interviewed in Africa found the idea of importing con-
victs laughable because of African governments’ close scrutiny of and long delays
in processing applications for visas and work permits. Managers complain that it
takes many months or even years to obtain visas and work permits and that
bringing anyone from China is expensive. In 2010, visas for Chinese workers
going to Angola, together with travel costs and welfare payments, cost as
much as US$20,000.83
Other researchers of China–Africa links have also found no evidence of
Chinese convicts. Deborah Brautigam stated: “I ask about this issue fairly fre-
quently during my research and have never come across any evidence of
Chinese prisoners working in Africa.”84 Martyn Davies, head of the South
African research and strategy consultancy Frontier Advisory, has described the
claims as “absolute rubbish.”85 Anna Ying Chen, research associate at the
South African Institute of International Affairs, said that: “The rumour that
Chinese companies employ prisoners who are confined to their own camp to
save costs is indeed a misperception.”86 Chris Burke and Lucy Corkin, in a report
on Chinese construction firms in African countries, wrote that although there
were “widespread rumours of Chinese construction companies in all countries
surveyed using Chinese prison labour … we found no evidence to support
these rumours.”87 Swiss journalists Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, who visited
many African countries for a book on the Chinese presence, said that “in all our
travels we have not met a single [Chinese prisoner] and feel free to assert that this
is anti-Chinese propaganda.”88 The African Labour Research Network produced
in 2009 a critical study by African researchers of Chinese investment in African
countries. Its ten lengthy case studies focused on labour conditions for Africans
and Chinese, but none reported any presence of Chinese convicts.89
82 “Getting up to Shenzhen speed,” Insight (Namibia), April 2006, p. 21, http://crgp.stanford.edu/
publications/articles_presentations/Chinese_puzzle.pdf.
83 Thornilley, “Chinese entrepreneurs.”
84 Deborah Brautigam, “Is China sending prisoners to work overseas?” China in Africa: The Real Story, 13
August 2010, www.chinaafricarealstory.com/.
85 “Chinese will maintain African investment, says frontier advisory,” Metals Bulletin, 12 February 2009.
86 Anna Ying Chen, “China’s role in infrastructure development in Botswana,” SAIIA, Occasional Paper
No. 44 (2009), p. 11.
87 Chris Burke and Lucy Corkin, China’s Interest and Activities in Africa’s Construction and Infrastructure
Sectors (Stellenbosch: CCS, 2008), p. 82.
88 Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa (New York:
Nation Books, 2009), p. 252.
89 Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch, Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective, African
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Rumour propagators also cannot explain why China’s government would
incur the reputational risk and expense to send convicts abroad. After all, few
convicts are highly skilled. An Angolan responding to the rumour, transmitted
by Germans building a brewery in Huambo, that Chinese prisoners were building
a railway there, observed that “this made no sense [as] it was important for the
companies working in Angola to have good workers, and if there were prisoners
on the work crews, then the bosses would only have problems and this would be
counter-productive.”90 In developing countries, moreover, labour is relatively
cheap. Human Rights Watch has observed that:
It was widely rumoured in the oil business in Sudan that the Chinese planned to bring in prison-
ers to build the pipelines, which was allegedly how they underbid others to get the pipeline con-
tract. Still, it is difficult to see how Chinese labourers brought to Sudan could live and work for
less than southern Sudanese labourers, even Chinese prisoners, because of the transportation
cost.91
Often claims of Chinese convicts abroad are based on the idea that China over-
flows with prisoners. In fact, China has about the same number of prisoners –
including those in administrative detention – as the US does (some two million),
although China’s population is more than four times as large.92 Moreover, in the
US “federal prisons house 60 per cent more inmates than they were designed for.
State lock-ups are only slightly less stuffed.” Annual incarceration costs for US
prisoners range from $18,000 in Mississippi to $50,000 in California. The two
reasons given by Schwarzenegger for his proposal to export prisoners to
Mexico were overcrowding and cost-saving,93 yet Chinese prisons have no econ-
omic incentive to export inmates. In 1999, the average annual cost of incarcerat-
ing a prisoner in China was 10,000 yuan (about US$1,200) and Chinese prisoners
produce saleable goods that partly cover the their incarceration costs. Even if
these costs have doubled since then, savings could hardly be had by shipping
them to far-off countries.
On an Unlevel Playing Field: Chinese Reactions to Claims of Convicts
Sent Abroad
Rumours are very difficult to dispel, especially in the internet age, so much so
that Cass Sunstein, Harvard legal scholar and head of Obama’s White House
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, questions long-held beliefs
about the marketplace of ideas bringing about truth: “Far from being the best
90 “The Bavarians in Huambo,” CS Angola Project, 13 October 2009, http://c6angola.wordpress.com/
2009/10/page/2./
91 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan, oil and human rights,” 23 November 2003, www.hrw.org/en/node/
12243/section/32.
92 Roy Walmsley, “World prison population list” (8th ed.), Kings College London, International Centre
for Prison Studies, 2008, www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
93 “Two many laws, too many prisoners,” Economist (UK), 22 July 2010; “Practical, humanitarian means
can help relieve crowded Chinese prisons,” Dialogue.Online, No. 25 (2009), www.duihua/org/work/
publications/nl/dialogue/nl_txt/n135/n135_2c.htm; Buchanan, Governor Looks.
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test of truth, the marketplace can ensure that many people accept falsehoods …
The problem is serious and pervasive, and – with the growing influence of the
Internet and new kinds of surveillance – it seems to be increasing.”94
Efforts at dispelling rumours may end up being “self-defeating corrections,”
reinforcing the belief in the rumours.95 A source of political “information” every-
where, rumours are more apt to be credited where they arise in a political culture
deemed to be non-transparent. A Dutch scholar of China’s public diplomacy has
typically argued that the Chinese government is almost necessarily disbelieved,
because “state organizations … are seldom trusted as messengers and China’s
government is trusted even less by foreign audiences.”96 It follows that even if
the Chinese government denies it sends out convicts, as it did in 1991 and
2010, the denials are to be dismissed as “propaganda,” allowing the rumours
to subsist. China’s officials, such as its ambassador to Algeria, have consistently
denied that China exports prisoners.97 Its Ministry of Commerce, Department of
Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, argued that Chellaney has no
evidence and that the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of
Exit and Entry of Citizens forbids persons with criminal or administrative deten-
tion records to leave the country to work.98 The Chinese embassy in Britain has
added that “Chinese companies are not permitted to hire people with criminal
records to work on their overseas projects.”99 Yet Chinese officials find them-
selves in the same position as Obama, who has said in frustration that he often
denies claims he is foreign-born, but “can’t spend all of my time with my birth
certificate plastered on my forehead.”100
With Chinese government denials dismissed out of hand, Western media nega-
tivity about the Chinese government and reflexive characterization of Chinese
statements as propaganda are sufficient to unlevel the discursive field. The
same dismissive attitude holds true for denials by developing country officials.
A researcher who has studied perceptions of the Chinese in Angola has related
that because of the local government’s credibility problem:
During informal conversation I was told “Angola is a land of rumours” and I later met this pro-
blem several times during my collection of information. People often referred to rumours and
the word on the street, for example, that the governmental-owned Chinese enterprises used
Chinese prisoners as work force in Angola.101
94 Sunstein, On Rumors, p. 10.
95 Ibid. p. 46.
96 Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The limits of China’s soft power in Europe: Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle,”
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With the Chinese and developing country governments written off as not cred-
ible, it is rare for those reporting the existence of Chinese convict labour abroad
to indicate that their assertion is based on rumour. A few who foster the rumour
admit that evidence for it has not yet been produced, but attribute that to the dis-
ingenuousness of receiving state governments. A Nigerian on a US-based disap-
ora website wrote that
The latest information on the atrocities of the Chinese against Africans is the practice of bring-
ing Chinese convicts who are released to come and serve their sentences in Africa by providing
cheap labor to Chinese firms, thereby undermining the local technicians. This is true, but has
not been documented anywhere for now. Who will confront them and do the right thing?
Not our dealers masquerading as leaders.102
Firms accused of employing prisoners have also issued denials, explained why
importing convicts is not possible and provided the backgrounds of the Chinese
they do employ. When Shanghai Construction Co. began building the Sekondi
Sports Complex in Ghana, a Ghanaian reporter asked the firm’s CEO, Mr
Hu, “how many prisoners he had brought to Ghana for the job,” a question
based on an existing “widespread rumour, which has already been carried by
different media houses to the effect that his company has brought into the
country Chinese prisoners to work on the project.” Hu said the 60 Chinese
workers at the site were employees of his firm in China experienced in stadium
construction and 60 more would come to help meet the completion deadline.
Some Chinese were doing unskilled work at the site because a Ghanaian com-
pany that Hu had hired to supply local workers was still gearing up to do so,
a statement confirmed by the Ghanaian firm. Hu queried the assembled journal-
ists: “If these workers were Chinese prisoners, why did the Ghana government
grant them visas to enter this country to work?”103
More telling still were responses to the rumour by two well-known former
Chinese citizens now living in the United States. The BBC’s Chinese service
asked Wu Hongda (Harry Wu) for his view of Chellaney’s charges. Wu, founder
of the Laogai Foundation in the US, served 19 years in prison as a counterrevo-
lutionary, moved to the US and became a political activist critical of the Chinese
government, especially of its prison system. He responded that it is impossible
that China exports prisoners overseas. Wu stated that Chinese firms overseas
sometimes use a “military camp” ( junying) management style, which may give
the misimpression that employees are prisoners, but added that as far as labour
export is concerned, China does not lack labour resources and has no need to
export prisoners. He concluded that he has found not even a clue that China
sends prisoners overseas. The BBC also interviewed Li Qiang, head of
102 Olamide, response to Adeniyi Ologunleko, “China: the dangers of the dragon,” Nigerian Village
Square, 26 December 2008, www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/j/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=11044:china-the-dangers-of-a-dying-dragon&catid=67:Guestpercent20&Itemid=46.
103 “Employ local people: Osafo-Maafo to Chinese,” Ghanaian News Agency, 9 February 2006, http://
ghananationalcouncil.org/blog/2006/02/; “Controversy over Chinese workers,” Ghanaian Chronicle, 9
February 2006.
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US-based China Labor Watch and critic of the Chinese government on labour
issues. He stated that the probability is low that the Chinese government
would allow Chinese firms to export prisoners, as it clearly understands how
much damage this would do to China’s image internationally.104
Chinese journalists and netizens have also commented on the rumours. In the
weeks that followed the publication of Chellaney’s article, news of it and the
responses appeared on tens of thousands of Chinese-language websites. Some
comments regard the rumours as shockingly stupid, deeply ideological
China-bashing. A newspaper article focused on Chellaney’s lack of evidence
for any of his claims and commented on his “anti-China” politics and his
national and gender discriminatory positions within the Indian political con-
text.105 One poster to a BBS sarcastically called the allegation “creative,” and
considered that if indeed prisoners were exported to work, they would probably
accomplish nothing, given the need for surveillance, their unwillingness to show
initiative and their low level of skill.106 Another netizen argued that it would
obviously be more costly, both financially and politically, to surveil convicts
sent abroad than keep them imprisoned in China.107 Others have seen the mistak-
ing of Chinese workers as prisoners as an opportunity to reflect on the conditions
of Chinese working abroad. One pointed out that in the past 30 years many aver-
age Chinese have not enjoyed the fruits of China’s development, including some
who had gone abroad to work, but have instead had onerous working conditions
that lead people abroad to conclude erroneously that they are prisoners.108
Conclusion: Convicts Abroad as the New Metaphor for China
The notion that China sends convicts to developing countries is only new in the
sense that, with media syndication and the internet, the rumour is now heard
globally for the first time. It is often embedded in a discourse of negative charac-
teristics attributed to “China,” whose antagonists can promote the notion as a
new metaphor for the country. It groups together condemnatory themes. There
is a theme of authoritarianism, with its super-abundance of prisoners and
“slave labourers,” an idea promoted by some Western officials, such as one
104 Wei Liang “Zhongguo xiang haiwai shuchu qiufan: zhize yu fanbo” (“Chinese export of prison labour
overseas: accusations and rebuttals”), BBC Zhongwen Wang, 1 August 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/
zhongwen/trad/china/2010/08/100810_ana-China_prisoner.shtml.
105 Sun Lizhou, “Ying wangyou libo Yindu xuezhe huangyan” (“British netizens forcefully refute Indian
scholar’s lies”), Qingnian cankao, 13 August 2010, www.cyol.net/qnck/content/2010-08/13/
content_3374617.htm.
106 Han Mei, “Zhen you chuangyi ah!” bbs.huanqiu.com, 23 August 2010, http://bbs.huanqiu.com/
huanqiubaoliaotai/thread-418129-1-1.html.
107 Liu Haitian, “‘Zhongguo pai qiufan dao jingwai zuo laogong’ baodao shi yuchun de zhengzhi wumie”
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from the US embassy in Angola who told a public forum in Luanda that China is
trying to create a “new slave empire in Africa.”109 There is also a theme of yet
another Chinese export, along with purported “floods” of cheap, hazardous
goods, which threaten the employment and safety of the peoples of importing
countries. Finally, there is the theme of colonialism, which includes the idea
that sending convicts abroad involves not just their cruel exploitation but also
implantation of the agents and castoffs of a colonial metropole.
To speak of the export of Chinese prisoners now conjures up this whole
emotionally evocative mix. Metaphors are often used in fiction, where a suspen-
sion of disbelief may be required. The lack of evidence of the rumours’ veracity
thus presents no great obstacle to its deployment as a metaphor in soft power
strategic competition, as studies cited above indicate Western media construct
a narrative that portrays China in developing regions as neo-colonialist and the
West as beneficent.
Repudiations of claims that Chinese prisoners work abroad raise the question
of whether rumour promoters, such as Chellaney, understand principles of proof.
Perhaps they concur with the logic of former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s statement about non-existent weapons of mass destruction in pre-war
Iraq: “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” They also seem una-
ware that one against whom a claim is made does not have the burden of proof,
especially to prove a negative – such as that it does not send out prisoners – but
that the whole burden of going forward with evidence lies with the claim’s
proponents.
The unquestioned acceptance and unchecked circulation of the “urban myth”
of Chinese convicts abroad through mainstream media outlets should give us
pause: like a ghost, the rumour’s materiality consists of nothing more than the
effects its putative presence has on the people who believe in it. Perhaps then
not all prisoners are confined behind thick walls and electrified fences; some sit
behind editorial desks and are prisoners of their own ideological prejudices.
The Chinese government may have largely worked within the existing inter-
national order and conciliated the big powers, but its residual political difference
and putative rise is the new context in which Western and allied political forces
are geared up for an extended effort at “containment.” As in the last great effort,
first of containment and then dissolution of the former “socialist bloc,” demoni-
zation will be a key element in the contest.110 The notion that China exports con-
victs to developing countries is likely to have a role in that struggle, because even
in the absence of proof, these rumours are ghosts that can be chased after, but
cannot be easily chased away.
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